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*E.L. Rev. 687  This comment on the European Court of Justice's decision of April 29, 
2004 in the IMS Health case first gives an account of the procedural and factual background 
of the case. The state of the case law decided prior to the decision is summarised for a 
better understanding of the decision. The decision clarifies the circumstances under which 
a refusal to licence copyright will be abusive. It also states that the degree of participation 
of the pharmaceutical companies in the development of IMS's structure and the effort that 
those companies would have to make in order to purchase reports made on the basis of 
another structure are important elements in the determination of the indispensability of the 
structure. The decision can be positively criticised for the fact that the Court has finally 
clarified the case law on abuses of dominant position by copyright holders and that it 
conciliates copyright and competition laws. It also resettles the balance between 
competition and copyright. However, the Court leaves the concept of new product 
undefined, entertaining legal uncertainty and allows the imposition of the licence 
immediately, which might undermine copyright holders' efforts and reduce their incentive 
to create in the first place.   
Introduction   
Just two days before the entry of the 10 new Member States in the Union, the European 
Court of Justice (“ the Court” ) gave its final ruling in the long-lasting litigation opposing 
IMS Health (“ IMS” ), the dominant player in the marketing of regional sales data on 
pharmaceutical products, to its competitor, NDC Health (“ NDC” ).1 The case involved the 
refusal by IMS to licence its copyrighted structure to NDC. The Court closely follows 
Advocate General (“ A.G.” ) Tizzano's Opinion and confirms the current case law as 
embodied in the Court's seminal Magill ruling. The decision is crucial to the area of 
competition law dealing with abuses of dominant position by copyright holders as it clarifies 
the Community courts' rather murky case law in this field. It is now clear that four 
cumulative conditions are necessary for a refusal to licence copyright to be abusive: the 
copyright work must be indispensable to operate in the secondary market, the person 
asking the licence must intend to create a new product for which there is a potential 
consumer demand, the refusal must not be justified and the refusal is likely to eliminate all 
competition in the secondary market. The decision strikes an adequate balance between 
competition and copyright laws by making a difference between copyright and other *E.L. 
Rev. 688  forms of property in the conditions required for abuse. Moreover, the additional 
condition required for establishing an abuse by a copyright holder (the competitor must 
intend to market a new product) simultaneously respects copyright's aims and furthers 
competition and innovation. The decision is however not without flaws. The condition of 
new product is left undefined and the Court allows for the immediate imposition of a 
compulsory licence in case of abuse. The comment closes with a speculation of the possible 
outcome of the case at national level.  
Factual and procedural background   
IMS2 provides in Germany reports informing pharmaceutical companies on regional sales 
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of their pharmaceutical products. It does so under a “ brick structure”  dividing Germany 
into 1860 modules or geographical zones. Years before the creation of the structure, IMS 
set up a working group composed of its clients, the pharmaceutical companies, which made 
suggestions in the elaboration of this structure. Soon, IMS's structure became largely 
adopted not only by pharmaceutical companies but also by doctors and pharmacies. When 
a former manager of IMS created Pharma Intranet (“ PI” ) in 1998, he entered the market 
with a different structure from IMS's. But he soon encountered the reticence of the 
pharmaceutical companies, who, accustomed to IMS's 1860 brick structure, refused to 
adopt the new structure. PI therefore commercialised a structure very similar to IMS's. IMS 
sued PI for copyright infringement, claiming that its 1860 brick structure was a database 
and was protected by copyright. In 2000, the Landgericht Frankfurt am Main prohibited PI 
from using any structure derived from IMS's structure3 and after the absorption of PI by 
NDC, issued the same prohibition to NDC.4 These orders were later confirmed.5   
On December 19, 2000, NDC introduced a complaint to the European Commission against 
IMS for abuse of dominant position because IMS denied NDC a licence to use its structure. 
In July 2001, the Commission, by interim measure, ordered IMS to grant a licence on its 
1860 structure to all undertakings already present in the market.6 On IMS's appeal 
(application for interim relief), the President of the Court of First Instance (“ CFI” ) *E.L. 
Rev. 689  suspended the decision7 and the President of the Court confirmed the 
suspension.8 On August 13, 2003, the Commission withdrew its decision of July 3, 2001, 
because it did no longer consider necessary that IMS opens the market to its competitors.9 
This left unaffected the reference for a preliminary ruling which the Landgericht Frankfurt 
am Main asked the Court on the interpretation of Art.82 in the context of the action for 
copyright infringement of IMS's structure.10 On October 2, 2003, the Advocate General 
delivered his Opinion in this procedure.11   
The crucial question in the case is whether IMS, by refusing to licence the use of its 
structure to NDC, is committing a breach of Art.82 EC, namely, abusing its dominant 
position. Since the national court established dominance, the only question before the 
Court was whether the refusal was abusive.  
Summary of the case law before IMS   
Before examining the Court's ruling in IMS, a brief summary of the state of the case law as 
it stood before is in order. As stated in the introduction, before the IMS decision, the case 
law relating to a particular type of abuse, the refusal to licence an intellectual property right, 
was rather muddled. While on the one hand, it has always been clear that the mere 
ownership and mere exercise of an intellectual property right (here, the mere refusal to 
grant a licence) cannot in itself confer a dominant position nor consist in an abuse of such 
a position,12 the conditions or circumstances under which a refusal to licence is abusive 
have varied with time. It is first in the Magill case that the Court set forth the circumstances 
under which such abuse will exist.13 These three exceptional circumstances were: (1) the 
intellectual property right holder prevents the appearance of a new product which he does 
not offer and for which there was a potential consumer demand; (2) the refusal is not 
justified; (3) the intellectual property right holder reserves to himself a secondary market 
by excluding all competition on that market.14 It is not clear from the judgment whether 
these conditions are concurrent or alternative. The Court did not use the word “ and”  to 
connect them and the literature has always remained divided on the topic.  
*E.L. Rev. 690  The next judgment to treat of an abuse of an intellectual property right 
was Ladbroke. 15 The CFI took the first Magill condition (the prevention of the development 
of a new product) and added a new one which it clearly set forth as alternative (the product 
is indispensable for the competitor to exercise his activity in that there is no real or 
potential substitute for it).16 Thus an abuse of an intellectual property right was possible at 
two alternative conditions. The last relevant case before IMS was Bronner. 17 Although it 
did not deal with an intellectual property right (but with the refusal by a newspaper 
company to distribute another newspaper in addition to its own by its early home-delivery 
service), the Bronner judgment has reinterpreted all the previous cases. The Court set 
three cumulative conditions combining the two last conditions of Magill and the new one 
the CFI had added in Ladbroke. 18 In other words, to establish an abuse, the refusal must 
be likely to eliminate all competition in the secondary market, such refusal cannot be 
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objectively justified and the product or service must be indispensable to carry on the 
activity of the person seeking the licence, inasmuch as there is no actual or potential 
substitute.  
As a result of this shilly-shallying, several interpretations of the case law were possible. In 
the IMS case, the Commission took the position that the relevant applicable case was 
Bronner while the President of the CFI and the court rather thought that it was Magill. The 
Commission found the Bronner conditions fulfilled and consequently imposed a compulsory 
licence on IMS while the Presidents suspended the decision implying that the Magill 
conditions were cumulative and that the condition of the prevention of the development of 
new product was most probably not fulfilled.  
Decision of the Court of Justice   
 
Circumstances under which a refusal to license is abusive   
There are two main issues addressed in the judgment. The first and most important one 
concerns the conditions under which a refusal to license is abusive. The Court follows its 
well-established case law. First, referring to Volvo and Magill, it recalls that a refusal by a 
copyright holder to license the reproduction right, even if it is in a dominant position, 
cannot per se constitute an abuse of a dominant position but adds that the exercise of this 
exclusive right can in exceptional circumstances be abusive.19   
To establish the conditions under which the refusal of a copyright holder is abusive, the 
Court then refers to the summary it made of the Magill conditions in Bronner 's para.[40] 
which it rewrites in full word for word. These conditions are that the refusal concerned a 
product the supply of which was indispensable for carrying the business in question in that 
the person wishing to make the product would find it impossible to do so, that the refusal 
is preventing the emergence of a new product for which there is a potential consumer 
demand, that it is not justified by objective considerations and that it is likely to *E.L. Rev. 
691  exclude all competition in the secondary market. The Court expressly states that 
these conditions are cumulative.20   
The three conditions are reviewed by the Court one by one. As regards the condition 
relating to the prevention of the emergence of a new product, the Court follows closely the 
Advocate General. This condition reflects the necessary balance that must be struck 
between on the one hand, the interest in protecting copyright and on the other hand, the 
interest in protecting free competition.21 The interest in protecting competition can only 
prevail where the “ refusal to grant a licence prevents the development of the secondary 
market to the detriment of consumers” .22 Therefore the refusal to licence the use of a 
copyright work is abusive only if the competitor intends to produce new goods or services 
not offered by the owner of the copyright (in other words he does not simply wish to 
duplicate the goods or services offered on the secondary market by the copyright owner) 
and for which there is a potential consumer demand.  
The Court does barely address the second condition (whether the refusal is justified or not 
by objective considerations).23 The parties did not make observations on its interpretation. 
Therefore the Court only states that it is for the national court to determine whether the 
refusal is justified or not by objective considerations. No further guidance is given as to 
what is an “ objective refusal” .  
For the interpretation of the last condition (the likelihood of excluding all competition in a 
secondary market), the Court relies on Bronner. It confirms that there must be two 
markets, one upstream, constituted by the product or service (in Bronner, the market for 
home delivery of daily newspapers and in IMS, the structure in 1860 modules) and one, 
downstream or secondary, on which the product or service is used for the production of 
another product or service (in Bronner, the market for daily newspapers and in IMS, the 
reports on regional sales).24 The Court reiterates that it is essential that two markets be 
identified and interconnected, but that it is sufficient that the upstream market is only 
hypothetical.25 Since the national court had decided that the structure is essential to the 
marketing of the reports, the A.G. found it is easy to identify two markets, one upstream 
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for access to the brick structure and the second downstream for the sale of the reports. The 
Court is more laconic and simply says it is for the national court to determine whether the 
structure constitutes upstream an indispensable factor in the downstream supply of reports 
on sales of medicines. It will thus also be for the national court to determine whether the 
refusal is capable of eliminating all competition in the market for the supply of such sales 
data.26   
The criteria to determine the indispensability of the structure   
The second issue seeks to determine the criteria to establish whether IMS's structure is 
indispensable for competitors to market products in the same market as IMS. More *E.L. 
Rev. 692  precisely, the question is whether, to appreciate when a copyrighted structure 
is indispensable to market reports on regional sales of pharmaceutical products in a given 
country, the degree of participation of the representatives of the pharmaceutical 
companies in the development of the structure and the effort that those companies would 
have to make in order to purchase reports made on the basis of a structure other than the 
structure protected by copyright are important elements. The A.G. and the Court rely on 
paras [43] and [44] of Bronner. For both of them it is clear that to determine whether a 
product or service is essential for enabling a competitor to do business in a market, it must 
be determined whether such products or services already exist even if they are less 
advantageous and whether “ there are technical, legal or economic obstacles capable of 
making it impossible or at least unreasonably difficult for any undertaking seeking to 
operate in the market to create, possibly in co-operation with other operators, the 
alternative products or services” .27 The Court adds that “ according to para.[46] of Bronner, 
in order to accept the existence of economic obstacles, it must be established, at the very 
least, that the creation of those products or services is not economically viable for 
production on a scale comparable to that of the undertaking which controls the existing 
product or service” .28   
In the Court's opinion, if it is proven that there has been a high level of participation of the 
pharmaceutical companies in the improvement of the structure, this will have created such 
a dependency of the companies so that it is very likely that they would have to make huge 
efforts to acquire reports based on an alternative structure. Therefore if this is the case, it 
is very likely that the producer of the reports structured differently would have to offer 
those reports at such conditions that it would not be economically viable to engage in that 
business on a scale comparable to that of IMS.29 The Court concludes that clearly the 
degree of participation of the companies in the development of the structure and the costs 
that the potential users would have to bear in order to purchase regional sales studies 
presented on the basis of another structure are elements to be taken into consideration 
when determining whether the structure is essential for the marketing of reports on 
regional sales of medicines.30 This means that the costs to switch to another structure and 
the degree of participation of the companies in the elaboration of the existing structure 
could be obstacles which would make it impossible or unreasonably difficult to create an 
alternative product. The Court leaves it to the national court to determine whether such 
conditions are fulfilled in the case at hand.  
Comment   
 
Clarification of the case law   
No doubt the most important contribution of the decision is the clarification of the number, 
content and cumulative character of the conditions which must be fulfilled to find that a 
refusal to licence constitutes an abuse of a dominant position. Four concurrent conditions 
are necessary and sufficient to find that the refusal by a copyright holder in a dominant 
position is abusive: the product protected by copyright must be indispensable to compete 
*E.L. Rev. 693  in the secondary market,31 the refusal to licence copyright must prevent 
the emergence of a new product for which there is a potential consumer demand, it must 
not be justified by objective considerations and it must be likely to eliminate all competition 
in the secondary market.32 Whereas those four conditions are not new but spring from a 
combined reading of the Magill and Bronner rulings, as has been shown in the short 
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summary of the case law, it was far from clear whether the conditions were cumulative or 
not and which ones should apply.33 The Court, in its well-known manner, is patently proud 
to announce that its case law has always been clear and consistent. In a way it is not false, 
if one refers to para.[40] of Bronner in isolation. But combined with its para.[41], and with 
a reading of all previous decisions together, it was much less obvious, as the abundant 
commentaries on the topic have amply shown. Even if one can disagree with the content of 
the ruling in itself, the Court should in any case be applauded for having at least clarified its 
case law.  
Difference of treatment between copyright and tangible property for the 
application of Article 82   
The Court makes a difference, albeit implicit, between copyright and other forms of 
tangible property in its application of Art.82. The conditions under which a refusal by a 
copyright holder and by the holder of another form of property is abusive are different. An 
additional condition is required for a refusal to licence a copyright. This can be derived from 
para.[48], combined with the clearer points of the A.G. to which the Court specifically 
refers. The analysis of the A.G. had, in our view plainly, made a difference between 
intellectual property rights and other forms of property. Its analysis of the markets makes 
clear that in a case involving tangible property (the A.G. takes the example of the owner of 
a port whose access is indispensable in order to be able to provide maritime transport 
services) three conditions are necessary for the refusal to grant access to be abusive. First, 
the facility must be essential, second, the refusal must be unjustified and third, the refusal 
would eliminate all competition in the secondary market.34 These conditions match Bronner 
's tripartite cumulative test.35 The A.G.'s analysis for other *E.L. Rev. 694  forms of 
property than intellectual property rights stops short at these three conditions. They are 
necessary but also sufficient. The A.G. clearly says:  
the judgments of the Court on the refusal to grant a licence over an intellectual property 
right lead me to believe that, in order for an unjustified refusal to be deemed abusive, it is 
not sufficient that the intangible asset forming the subject-matter of the intellectual 
property right be essential for operating on a market and that therefore, by virtue of that 
refusal, the owner of the copyright may eliminate all competition on the secondary market. 
(Emphasis added).36   
He makes an exception to the rule for intellectual property rights. For a refusal to licence an 
intellectual property right to be abusive, the condition of the prevention of the emergence 
of a new product must be fulfilled in addition to the other three “ Bronner conditions” .  
The Court generally follows this reasoning but, contrary to the A.G., restricts its ruling to 
copyright rather than all intellectual property rights. The decision gives the certainty that 
for refusals to licence copyright to be abusive, four conditions must be fulfilled, the Bronner 
conditions together with the condition of new product. Arguably, if interpreted as we 
suggest, the Court's decision is a prime example of consistency since it sticks closely to 
both its precedents. Magill applies for abuses of dominant position by copyright holders and 
Bronner applies for abuses of dominant position by holders of tangible property. This 
differentiation was already in germ in the Bronner decision.37 Future decisions will have to 
establish a rule for the remaining intellectual property rights.  
Reconciliation of copyright and competition laws and resettlement of the 
balance between the two laws   
By requiring different conditions for different types of property rights, the Court also 
reconciles copyright and competition laws. At the same time it also strikes a good balance 
between the two laws.  
Traditionally those two bodies of law are seen as being in tension. Competition law is seen 
as emasculating copyright owners by expropriating them from their rights. However both 
laws have as a goal to promote competition38 and enhance social welfare.39 In most 
countries,40 copyright is seen by a majority of authors and courts as pursuing mainly *E.L. 
Rev. 695  economic efficiency and public interest functions.41 Copyright's aim is to benefit 
the public by encouraging the production and dissemination of new works,42 hence to 
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promote progress and innovation.  
By its decision, the Court respects both laws' aims. For traditional tangible property rights, 
the Court makes competition law prevail by requiring only the three Bronner conditions. 
But it preserves copyright and at the same time entices innovation by requiring an 
additional condition to be fulfilled when the abuse springs from the holder of a copyright. It 
preserves copyright in the sense that no compulsory licence can be imposed if the 
competitor does not propose to market a new product. It would go against the aim of 
copyright of encouraging the creation of works to force the copyright holder to grant a 
licence to reproduce his work “ as such” . Identical works would be in competition with his 
on the market. The copyright holder would have no incentive in the first place to create if 
he knows he will be obliged to grant a licence to all competitors simply because his work is 
essential to compete in a secondary market. Simply applying the Bronner conditions 
without this additional condition trumps copyright. Although the copyright holder would 
receive a licensing fee, he would not able to behave as he wishes as he would have to share 
his market with competitors. But to prevent the emergence of a new product is contrary to 
both competition and copyright laws. If the refusal of the copyright owner prevents the 
appearance of a new product on the market, it arguably goes against the very aim of 
copyright (promoting innovation). Thus requiring this additional condition does not 
frustrate copyright but on the contrary respects its aims. Furthermore, requiring this 
condition actually enhances innovation and competition: if potential competitors know that 
they would be granted a licence if they can create a new product, it encourages them to be 
innovative. Society can only be better off because there will be a better product on the 
market. This is readily seen in the facts of the Magill case. By proposing to market a 
comprehensive weekly television guide, Magill was providing a new and better product to 
consumers. In conclusion, the addition of the condition of new product in the case of 
refusals to licence a copyright work strikes a good balance between the need to preserve 
copyright and the need to promote competition.  
Condition of new product left undefined   
This additional and crucial condition closes the series of positive criticisms on the decision 
and simultaneously opens the negative ones. The Court does not define the concept of new 
product nor gives any guidelines. The A.G. had talked rather of “ goods or services of a 
different nature” . It seems that such denomination is less vague than the word “ new” . A 
new product could arguably include the same product but at a lesser price or at better 
conditions (e.g. assistance on how to use the product is offered 24 hours a day seven days 
a week). But a condition requiring the product to be of a different nature should not include 
these scenarios. However, if, as can be deduced from the ruling, the Court sticks *E.L. Rev. 
696  to the meaning of “ new”  in Magill, then the product must definitely be different to be 
considered new. The term “ new”  did not there have a broad meaning but rather a narrow 
one. In addition, it could be argued that because the imposition of a licence on a copyright 
holder must remain exceptional,43 the conditions for imposing it must be interpreted 
restrictively. A new product in the IMS Health case would for instance be a report on sales 
of medicines structured another way or including additional information.  
Immediate imposition of the licence   
The decision could also be criticised for not specifying a period of time (e.g. a few years) 
after which the licence can be imposed. The licence can be imposed straight away, in the 
most extreme case, a few days or weeks after the copyright owner has marketed its 
creation. Perhaps this is a lacuna of the decision because imposing a licence so soon might 
diminish the incentive to create so much that the copyright owner, unable to reap the full 
benefits of its creation, might decide not to create in the first place. The Court ought 
perhaps to consider this in future decisions. An alternative to imposing a licence after a few 
years would be to enable the original creator to benefit from the new product created by 
the competitor thanks to his. Like in the field of patent improvements, a second 
compulsory licence would be imposed on the competitor to enable the original creator to 
exploit the new product.44   
Possible outcome of the dispute before the national court   
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After all these comments, one question remains: what will happen at national court level? 
The case is arguably less clear-cut than the Magill case. The battle in the national court will 
definitely be fought on the conditions of indispensability and of new product. The Court 
seems to be inclined to think that the structure is very likely indispensable because of the 
dependency of the companies on the existing structure. It also is inclined to believe that 
the production of an alternative product is not economically viable on a scale comparable 
as that of IMS. Thus NDC will seemingly have few difficulties to prove that the structure is 
indispensable and that therefore competition is eliminated in the secondary market. The 
structure has become a standard and the pharmaceutical companies seem totally locked in 
it since they do not want to change to another structure. Actually the national court is 
already convinced of that since it already determined the structure was indispensable in its 
decision. Therefore the core of the battle will be on whether NDC can prove it intends to 
market a new product and how the national court will interpret the word “ new” . IMS 
contends that NDC does not intend to create a new type of report whereas NDC pretends it 
does. If the narrow construction of the word is taken, it will be very difficult for NDC to win 
the case. IMS has thus rather high chances to escape the imposition of the licence.  
*E.L. Rev. 697  Conclusion   
The major impact of the decision is that it resettles the balance between competition and 
copyright and also respects both laws' rationales. Both competition and intellectual 
property lawyers should be satisfied. On the one hand, the essential facilities doctrine 
remains applicable to traditional property rights and on the other, a milder version of it, 
requiring an additional condition, is applicable to copyright. The whole package with the 
“ new product”  condition broadly respects copyright aims. The balance between copyright 
and competition is achieved with the safeguard of this very condition. Moreover, copyright 
holders should be even less worried than when Magill came out. They are now sure that the 
conditions are cumulative. Besides, it is arguably rare that many works protected by 
copyright will be indispensable. Not all such works are standards. The majority is most 
probably not. This means that the first condition will rarely be fulfilled. If it nevertheless is, 
before a licence can be imposed, the competitor eager to have access to the protected work 
will have to prove not only that he intends himself to innovate but also that the refusal to 
licence is unjustified. A rather strict test difficult to meet has thus been strengthened by the 
Court.  
LL.M., D.E.S., Lecturer in Intellectual Property Law, Queen Mary Intellectual Property 
Research Institute, University of London.  
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